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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ne Y ada, Inc. ("Ne Y ada") Appeals the district court's entry of summary 
judgment in favor of the Plaintiffs, Marian G. Hoke and The Hoke Family Trust ("Hoke"). The 
suit was brought by Hoke to set aside a Lease Agreement and Option to Purchase Hoke had 
entered into with Ne Yada pertaining to real property located in Canyon County, Idaho. Hoke 
alleged violation of the statute of frauds, proper party in interest, quiet title, undue influence and 
fraudulent misrepresentation. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Complaint in this matter was filed by Hoke in Canyon County, Idaho on January 12, 
2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 7. An Answer and Counterclaim was filed by NeYada on February 25, 2015. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 37. A Response to Counterclaim was filed by Hoke on March 19, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 
160. 
On February 27, 2015, NeYada filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking, among 
other matters, for a determination that the property description contained in the Lease Agreement 
and Option to Purchase complied with the statute of frauds. R. Vol. 1, p. 81. On March 19, 2015, 
Hoke filed her own Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. 1, p. 99. Her motion sought a 
determination that the documents violated the statute of frauds and the proper party in interest. At 
the time set for hearing on NeYada's Motion, March 26, 2015, the court discussed the Motions 
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before the court with Counsel in chambers. The Court, with agreement of counsel, gave the 
parties an additional eight (8) days, until April 3, 2015, to file simultaneous additional briefing 
on the legal issues of the statue of frauds and apparent authority. R. Vol. 1, p. 208, Tr. Vol. 1, p. 
5, L. 19-25, Tr. Vol. 1, p. 6, L. 1-7. 
On April 9, 2015, the court entered its Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiff's Counter Motion for Summary Judgment. R. Vol. 
1, p. 207. The Court granted Hoke's Motion for Summary Judgment. It found that the documents 
were unenforceable under the statute of frauds and that part performance did not remove the 
agreements under the statute of frauds. R. Vol. 1, p. 214. Judgment in favor of Hoke was entered 
on April 9, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 218. 
NeYada filed a Motion to Reconsider Order and to Set Aside Judgment on April 13, 
2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 220. The Court's Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider Order and to Set Aside Judgment was entered on May 6, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 263. The 
Court denied the Motion to Reconsider finding that the Lease and Option were a single 
transaction and therefore unenforceable under the statute of frauds. R. Vol. 1, p. 266. 
Ne Yada appealed the Judgment and Memorandum Decision denying the Motion to 
Reconsider on June 16, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 276. The Court granted Hoke's request for costs and 
attorney fees in its Memorandum Decision and Order for Costs and Attorney Fees and for 
Turnover of Property on July 22, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 292. NeYada filed an Amended Notice of 
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Appeal on August 6, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 302. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
For an appeal reconsidering a summary judgment motion, the appellate court will review 
whether the district court acted within the legal standards applicable fo summary judgment. 
Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263,267 (2000). Under Rule 56( c) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil procedure, summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issues as to 
any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw." If the 
evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment should be granted. 
Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 718-719, 918 P.2d 583, 587-588 (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Hoke is an elderly widow living in Canyon County, Idaho. R. Vol. 1, p. 111. She is the 
sole trustee of the Hoke Family Trust. R. Vol. 1, p. 111. The Hoke Family Trust is the owner of 
certain real property ("Subject Property") located at 16867 Portner Road, Nampa, Idaho. R. Vol. 
1, p. 111- 112. The Subject Property is commonly known as the "Hoke Mobile Home Park". R. 
Vol. 1, p. 8, 111. It consists of fourteen (13) mobile homes situated on approximately 1.96 acres. 
R. Vol. 1, p 15. The Subject Property is more specifically described as: 
A part of Lot 9 of PORTNER SUBDIVISION, being a part of the East Half of the Northwest 
Quarter, Section 7, Township 3 North, Range 2 West, Boise Meridian, Canyon County, Idaho, 
described as follows: 
BEGINNING at the Southeast comer of Lot 9 of said PORTNER SUBDIVISION, Canyon 
3 
County, Idaho, according to the plat filed in Book 4 of Plats, Page 43, records of said County, 
and running thence 
North 205 feet along the East boundary of said Lot 9; thence 
North 63°0' West 108 feet and 
North 81 °0' West 215. 7 feet to the intersection of the West boundary line of said Lot 9; thence 
South 287. 7 feet along said West line to the Southwest comer of said Lot 9; thence 
East 309.2 feet to the POINT OF BEGINNING. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 8. 
Hoke had the Subject Property listed for sale. R. Vol. 1, p. 112. Ne Yada made an offer to 
purchase the Subject Property. R. Vol. 1, p. 112. Closing took place on November 7, 2014. R. 
Vol. 1, p. 112. The transaction was structured as a lease of the property with an option to 
purchase. A Lease Agreement, Option to Purchase, Bills of Sale and Escrow Instructions were 
executed. R. Vol. 1, p. 54-65, 69-74, 112, 113, 115-137. 
The Lease Agreement listed Kenneth W. Hoke and Marian G. Hoke as the "Lessor". 
Hoke signed in her individual capacity. The address of the Subject Property was listed. Attached 
to the Lease was a listing of the various mobile homes. R. Vol. 1, p. 58-60, 119-121. The legal 
description was listed only as "07-03-2W NW Hokes TRLR [number of trailer] R255440000". R. 
Vol. 1, p. 54-60, 119-121. 
The Option to Purchase listed Kenneth W. Hoke & Marian G. Hoke as "seller". Hoke 
signed in her individual capacity. The Option to Purchase did not include the Subject Property 
address. It referenced a legal description to be attached as Exhibit "A". The attached Exhibit A 
listed the legal description as follows: "07-3N-2W PORTNER SUB TX 2 IN LT 9, TX 05292 & 
05293 IN BLK 9". R. Vol. 1, p. 61-65, 122-126. 
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Hoke received a total sum of $22.00 as part of the transaction. R. Vol. 1, p. 113, 138. She 
to Ne Yada the sum of $1,610.00 for the pro rata rents from the park tenants for the month of 
November, 2014. R, p. 68, 113, 
Immediately after closing, Hoke became concerned about the transaction. After 
consulting with counsel, a letter dated December 1, 2014 was sent to NeYada and Idaho Escrow 
LLC. The letter notified them that Hoke considered the transaction void. R. Vol. 1, p. 139. 
ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL/ ATTORl~EY FEES ON APPEAL 
SHOULD HOKE BE A WARDED ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL? 
Basis of the Claim for Attorney Fees 
The basis of the claim for attorney fees and costs is under Idaho Appellate Rule 40 and 
41, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) and 54(d)(l), Idaho Code §12-120(1), (3), Idaho Code 
§12-121 and the terms of the Lease Agreement. Hoke was the prevailing party below as she 
received a Summary Judgment in her favor for the relief she sought in the Complaint. 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) provides that the court may award attorney fees to 
the prevailing party when provided by statute or contract. Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54( d)(l) 
allows costs to the prevailing party as a matter of right. Discretionary costs may also be awarded. 
Idaho Code §12-120(1) provides that in any action where the amount plead is $35,000 or 
less, there shall be allowed to the prevailing party a reasonable amount to be fixed by the Court 
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as attorney fees. Idaho Code§ 12-120(3) provides that in any civil action to recover on an open 
account, account stated, note, bill, negotiable instrument, guaranty or contract relating to the 
purchase or sale of goods and in any commercial transaction, the prevailing party shall be 
allowed a reasonable attorneys' fee. The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all 
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes. 
Idaho Code §12-121 and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(l) allow in a civil action 
the award of reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party where the other party acted 
frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. 
The Lease Agreement provides that "In the event of Lessor or Lessee breach any of the 
terms of this Lease whereby the party not in default employs an attorney to protect or enforce its 
rights hereunder and prevails, then the defaulting party agrees to pay the other party reasonable 
attorneys' fees so incurred by such party." R. Vol. 1, p. 56, 117. 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN HOLDING THAT THE LEASE 
AGREEMENT AND OPTION TO PURCHASE ARE UNENFORCEABLE UNDER THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The Lease Agreement and Option to Purchase are both void. 
The Idaho statute of frauds requires that any conveyance, grant or assignment of an 
interest in real property be in writing. The District Court correctly found that the Lease 
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Agreement and Option to Purchase were conveyances of interests in real property that were 
insufficient under the statute of frauds. 
Idaho Code §9-503 provides that no estate or interest in real property, other than for 
leases for a term not exceeding one (1) year, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or 
declared other an by an instrument in writing subscribed by the party creating, granting, 
assigning, surrendering or declaring the same. 
Idaho Code §9-505 provides the following: 
In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or 
memorandum thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged, or 
by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the 
wTiting or secondary evidence of its contents: ( 1) An agreement that by its terms is 
not to be performed within a year from the making thereof. ... (4) An agreement 
for the leasing, for a longer period than one (1) year, for the sale, of real property, 
or of an interest therein, and such agreement, if made by an agent of the party 
sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent be in writing, 
subscribed by the party sought to be charged. 
In the case of Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 200 P.3d 1174 (2009), the Court addressed 
the issue of whether a physical address in a real estate contract sufficiently describes the property 
for purposes of the statute of frauds. In that case, Frasure entered into a real estate contract to sell 
certain real property. The contract listed the address of the property. The contract included a space 
for a legal description but it was left blank. After a delay in the closing, Frasure refused to proceed 
with the agreement. 
7 
The Court considered whether a physical address in a real estate contract sufficiently 
described the property for the purposes of the statute of frauds. The Court concluded that the 
property description consisting solely of a physical address does not satisfy the statute of frauds. 
Ray, 146 Idaho at 628,200 P.3d at 1177. The physical address gives no indication of the quantity, 
identity or boundaries of the real property. Ray, 146 Idaho at 628 and 630,200 P.3d at 1177 and 
1179. 
The Court noted that the statute of frauds renders an agreement for the sale of real property 
invalid unless the agreement is in writing and subscribed by the party charged or his agent. The 
Court went on to state that "Agreements for sale of real property that fail to comply with the 
statute of frauds are unenforceable both in an action at law for damages and in a suit in equity for 
specific performance." Ray, 146 Idaho at 628, 200 P .3d at 1177 ( quoting Hoffman v. SV Col, Inc., 
102 Idaho 187,190,628 P.2d 218,221 (1981)). 
Ray, supra, considered two early Idaho decisions as to the validity of a contract for the sale 
of real property. In the case of Kurdy v. Rogers, 10 Idaho 416,423, 79 P. 195, 196 (1904), the 
court found that a contract for the sale of real property must speak for itself and that a court may 
not admit parol evidence to supply any of the terms of the contract, including the description of 
the property. The description of the land in that case did not indicate the county or state in which 
the land was located. Id. The Court held that parol evidence is not admissible to supply any of the 
terms of the contract. Id. InAllen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 100 P. 1052 (1909), the contract did 
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not contain a complete description of the real property or refer to any external record containing a 
sufficient description. The contract did not include the city, county or state in which the property 
was located. Id 
In the case of Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 430, 80 P. 3d 1031 (2003) the Court 
addressed the reference in a purchase and sale agreement to an unidentified attached map and 
three tax notices. The Court held that the description of real property must adequately describe the 
property so that it is possible for someone to identify exactly what property the seller is conveying 
to the buyer. The property descriptions in the tax notices were incomplete and did not allow 
someone to identify exactly what property the seller was conveying to the buyer. Garner, 139 
Idaho at 435, 80 P.3d at 1036. In this case, although there is a general reference to what may be a 
tax parcel number, this reference is not enough to provide for a description of the Subject Property 
to identify exactly what property is involved. Listing only an address, or referencing a tax notice, 
is not sufficient to identify exactly what property was involved as they do not describe the 
quantity, identity or boundaries of the property. 
Subsequent to Ray, supra, the Idaho Federal District Court addressed the issue as to 
whether a right of first refusal was subject to the statute of frauds. In Magnolia Enters., LLC v. 
Schons, 2099 WL 1658022 *4 (D. Idaho 2009), the parties executed three writings, a Real Estate 
Purchase and Sale Agreement, an Addendum, and an agreement concerning the property sale. The 
Addendum and the agreement contained right of first refusal language. Neither document 
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contained a legal description of the real property. The court concluded that options were similar to 
a right of first refusal. 2009 WL 2658022*2. The cases of Lawyer v. Post et al., 109 F. 512,514 
(9th Cir. 1901) and Southern v. Southern, 92 Idaho 180,438 P.2d 925, 926-927 (Idaho 1968) were 
cited for the position that options must comply with the statute of frauds. 2009 WL 1658022*3. 
The court held that the standards set forth in Ray v. Frasure, supra, apply with equal force to an 
outright conveyance of property and to the conveyance of a limited property interest such as a 
right of first refusal. 
In this matter, the Lease and Option to Purchase both lacked adequate legal descriptions. 
The Lease Agreement describes the property as "that certain mobile home park formerly known as 
Hoke Mobile Home Park, consisting of 14 mobile home lots, and 13 mobile homes, situated on 
1.96 acres ofland located at 16867 Portner Rd. In Nampa, Idaho." R. Vol. 1, p. 115. Attached to 
the lease is a listing of the mobile homes. The descriptions were listed only as "07-03-2W NW 
Hokes TRLR [number of trailer] R2554400000." R. Vol. 1, p. 119-121. The Option to Purchase 
lists the real property as: 
Legal Description to be attached as Exhibit "A" 
That certain mobile home park known as Hoke Mobile Horne Park, consisting of 
14 mobile home lots, and 13 mobile homes, as more fully described in Exhibit 
"A" attached hereto. 
R, p. 122. 
The attached Exhibit "A" lists the legal description as "07-3N-2W PORTNER SUB TX IN LT9, 
TX 05292 & 05293 IN BLK 9." 
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The Option to Purchase did not include any reference to the city, county or state of the 
property in question. There was no indication of the quantity, identity or boundaries of the real 
property. It is impossible to identify exactly what property is involved. The legal description 
attached to the Option appears to be the legal description as listed on the county real property 
records. R. Vol. 1, p. 149. Such a reference was found to be inadequate in Garner, supra. This is 
not sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds as it is at best only a partial legal description without 
city, county or state. The reference to the "Hoke Mobile Home Park" does not provide an 
identifiable location for the property. This "Park" is not platted or identified on any recording in 
the Canyon County property records. This is merely a general reference to the property owned by 
Hoke and operated as a mobile home park. 
The documents must speak for themselves. "It is not a question as to what the contract 
was intended to be, but, rather, was it consummated by being reduced to writing as prescribed by 
the statute of frauds." Allen v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 145, 100 P. 1052, 1055 (1909). 
Although the documents are not of themselves purchase agreements, as was addressed in 
Ray, the transaction contemplated in this case was a conveyance of an interest in real property to 
Ne Y ada. As noted in Magnolia, supra, options must comply with the statute of frauds. Magnolia, 
2009 WL 1658022. The court in that case invalidated all three agreements entered into between 
the parties since two of the documents contained a right of first refusal that the court found must 
contain a proper legal description under the statue of frauds. In this case, the transaction involved 
both a lease and an option to purchase. The documents were executed in one transaction and 
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were expected by the parties to be one transaction. The documents are not severable from the 
other. Indeed, the Lease Agreements states "This Lease Agreement is subject to and contingent 
upon the Lessor entering into a written agreement with Ne Yada Inc., giving them the right to 
purchasethesubjectproperty."R. Vol.1,p.117. 
The option did not contain a proper legal description. It contained only a partial vague 
description without any reference to an address, city, county or state of the property. None of the 
documents executed by the parties on the same date include enough information to form or refer 
to a document with a proper legal description. 
The Lease Agreement is not enforceable on its own. 
NeYada asserts that the Lease Agreement and Option to Purchase are two separate 
documents whereby the Lease Agreement can be enforced even without enforcement of the 
Option to Purchase. This argument ignores the fact that the two documents were entered into as a 
single transaction at the same time. Neither document was intended to stand on its own without 
the other. The Lease Agreement specifically states that its is contingent upon the Option to 
Purchase. R. Vol. 1, p. 117. The Option to Purchase provides for a credit against the purchase 
price for lease payments made under the separate "Land Lease". R. Vol. 1, p. 122. 
There is no question that the two documents, the Lease Agreement and the Option to 
Purchase, were to comprise a single transaction. The documents cannot by their terms be severed 
from each other. The Lease Agreement was specifically made subject to and contingent upon the 
Option to Purchase. Therefore, since the Option to Purchase is invalid under the statute of frauds, 
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the Lease Agreement is invalid as well. 
\\,'here the parties assent to a group of promises as a single whole, the group of promises 
constitute a single contract. Krasselt v. Koester, 99 Idaho 124,126,578 P.2d 240,243 (1978). 
This Court should uphold the decision of the lower court and look at all the documents as a 
whole to conclude that the property was not properly described to satisfy the statute of frauds. 
The Lease Agreement cannot stand on its own. The entire transaction was properly set aside by 
the District Court. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN DECLINING TO APPLY THE 
DOCTRINE OF PARTIAL PERFORMANCE 
NeYada asserts that part performance takes the matter outside the statute of frauds. Idaho 
Code §9-504 states that the statute of frauds must not be construed to abridge the power of any 
court to compel specific performance of any agreement in the case of part performance. See also 
Simmons v. Simmons, 134 Idaho 824, 827, 11 P.3d 20, 23 (2000). Under the doctrine of part 
performance, "when the parties to an agreement fail to reduce the agreement to writing, or 
otherwise fail to satisfy the statute of frauds, the agreement "may nevertheless be specifically 
enforced when the purchaser has partly performed the agreement." Bauchman-Kingston P 'ship, 
LP v. Haroldson, 149 Idaho 87, 92,233 P. 3d 18, 23 (Idaho 2008) (citing Chapin v. Linden, 162 
P.3d 772, 775 (Idaho 2007). 
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Part performance may be established as an equitable ground to avoid the strictures of the 
statute of frauds. Wing v. Munns, 123 Idaho 493,499,849 P.2d 954, 961. The court stated: 
Another underlying principle, applicable where the contract does not comply with 
the statute of frauds, is that equity will not enforce it except in cases where a 
refusal to do so would be inequitable. Conversely, where a party has so 
performed, or changed his position in reliance on the contract, that to allow the 
other party to interpose the statute of frauds as a defense, would perpetrate a fraud 
on the performing party, and the legal remedy is inadequate, equity will decree 
specific performance. 
In this case, NeYada's part performance constitutes several payments into an escrow 
account. These payments were made after being notified by counsel for Hoke that the agreements 
are unenforceable. R. Vol. 1, p. 139. Such payments do not constitute fully or even a substantial 
portion of the payments to be made under the agreements. NeYada made a few payments under a 
lease to last for five (5) years. What constitutes part performance depends upon the particular 
facts of each case and the sufficiency of the particular acts is a matter of law to be determined by 
the court. Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 827, 11 P.3d 20, 23 (2000). Payments made by 
NeYada and actions taken by it after being notified of the defects in the documents does not 
constitute part performance sufficient for an equitable remedy of taking the matter outside the 
statute of frauds. 
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING ATTORJ.~EY FEES TO HOKE 
Hoke filed her Memorandum and Affidavit of Costs and Attorney Fees with the Court on 
April 23, 2015. R. Vol. 1, p. 254. Thereafter, the Court entered its Memorandum Decision and 
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Order for Costs and Attorney Fees and for Turnover of Property. R. Vol. 1, p. 292. The lower 
court found that Hoke was the prevailing party in the action under LR.C.P. 54(d)(l)(B). R. Vol. 
1, p. 294. The Court cited Bauchman-Kingston Partnership, LP v. Haroldson, 149 Idaho 87, 94, 
23 3 P .3d 18, 25 (2008) for the position that even when a contract is found unenforceable, the 
prevailing party may still recover attorney fees pursuant to the underlying agreement. R. Vol. 1, 
p. 295. 
This court should uphold the District Court's award of attorney fees to Hoke. She should 
be granted attorney fees on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
This court should affirm the ruling of the lower court that Hoke is entitled to Summary 
Judgment in her favor. The Lease Agreement and Option to Purchase are void under the statute 
of frauds. This court should further uphold the award of attorney fees by the lower court. Hoke 
should also receive attorney fees and costs on appeal. 
DATED this--"_ day of February, 2016. 
MORROW & FISCHER, PLLC 
Laura E. Burri 
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1 Federal Civil Procedure 
Land and land use, cases involving in 
general 
A genuine issue of material fact existed as to the 
precise legal description of the seller's retained 
property. The purchaser of real property had a 
right of first refusal to purchase seller's retained 
property, which the seller allegedly sold without 
first offering it to the purchaser. Therefore, 
summary judgment was precluded in a breach of 
contract claim. 
2 Cases that cite this headnote 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
Christopher J. Kerley, James B. King, Evans, Craven & 
Lackie, P.S., Spokane, WA, for Plaintiff. 
Douglas S. Marfice, Ramsden & Lyons, Coeur D'Alene, ID, 
for Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
B. LYNN WINMTLL, Chief Judge. 
INTRODUCTION 
*1 The Court has before it Plaintiffs Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment (Docket No. 10). The Court heard 
arguments of counsel on April 7, 2009. As explained 
below, after considering the briefs and arguments of counsel, 
the Court denies Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
This case arises from a real estate transaction. Plaintiff 
Magnolia Enterprises, LLC ("Plaintiff') agreed to purchase 
real property from Defendants. Three writings, signed by 
the parties to this action, concern the purchase and sale of 
Defendants' property to Plaintiff. First, the parties signed a 
Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement ("REPSA") on 
March 26, 2004. An addendum to the Real Estate Purchase 
and Sale Agreement ("Addendum") was signed by the parties 
on that same day. Then, on April 16, 2004, the parties 
signed another agreement ("Agreement") concerning the 
property sale. The REPSA references the Addendum and the 
Agreement references both the REPSA and the Addendum. 
Both the Addendum and the Agreement contain right of first 
refusal language. Both writings state: 
10. Right of First Refusal: The 
Purchaser shall have a First Right 
of Refusal to purchase Seller's 
retained property. Seller agrees to give 
Purchaser twenty (20) days written 
notice and a copy of all written 
offers Seller receives on their retained 
property. Purchaser must respond in 
writing and match the third party's 
offer within the twenty (20) days or the 
Seller is free to sell to the third party 
that wrote the offer. 
Neither document contains a definition of the "Seller's 
retained property." Nor do they contain a legal description 
of the retained property. However, pursuant to the terms 
of the Agreement, Defendants were to complete a lot-line 
adjustment after the sale. The lot-line adjustment required a 
survey and a second amended survey, which was completed at 
some point after all agreements had been signed. The survey 
described two parcels as "Parcel A" and "Parcel B." After 
the lot-line adjustment was completed, a warranty deed was 
executed conveying the "Parcel B" real property to Plaintiff. 
Subsequently, Defendants sold some of their real property, 
"Parcel A," without giving Plaintiff notice. Plaintiff claims 
the property sold was the "Seller's retained property" 
referenced in the right of first refusal in the Addendum and 
Agreement. Plaintiff then filed the complaint in this case in 
September of 2008, claiming breach of contract and seeking 
damages. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Standard of Review for Summary Judgment Motions 
One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment "is 
to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims .... " 
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 
2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). It is "not a disfavored 
procedural shortcut," but is instead the "principal tool[ ] 
by which factually insufficient claims or defenses [can] 
be isolated and prevented from going to trial with the 
attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private 
resources." Id at 327. "[T]he mere existence of some 
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an 
otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; 
the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material 
fact." Anderson v. Liberty lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 
106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 ( 1986). 
*2 The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable 
to the non-moving party, id at 255, and the Court must 
not make credibility findings. Id. On the other hand, the 
Court is not required to adopt unreasonable inferences from 
circumstantial evidence. Mclaughlin v. Liu. 849 F.2d 1205, 
1208 (9th Cir.1988). 
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Devereaux 
v. Abbey, 263 F.3d 1070, 1076 (9th Cir.2001) (en bane). 
To carry this burden, the moving party need not introduce 
any affirmative evidence (such as affidavits or deposition 
excerpts) but may simply point out the absence of evidence to 
support the nonmoving party's case. Fairbank v. Wunderman 
Cato Johnson. 212 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir.2000). 
This shifts the burden to the non-moving party to produce 
evidence sufficient to support a jury verdict in her favor. ld. at 
256-57. The non-moving party must go beyond the pleadings 
and show "by her affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to 
interrogatories, or admissions on file" that a genuine issue of 
material fact exists. Celotex. 477 U.S. at 324. 
II. Discussion 
The main disagreement between Plaintiff and Defendants 
on this motion is whether a sufficient description of the 
property subject to the right of first refusal is contained in 
the Agreement and Addendum. Plaintiff contends a right of 
first refusal is not an interest in real property subject to the 
statute of frauds, so that extrinsic evidence may be used to 
help define what the parties meant in using the term "Seller's 
retained property." Plaintiff further argues that, even if a right 
of first refusal is an interest in real property and subject to 
the statute of frauds, the standard for sufficiency of a property 
description is not as burdensome for a limited interest in 
real property as it is for the outright sale of real property. 
Defendants argue the statute of frauds applies with full force 
to a right of first refusal because it is an interest in real 
property, and that the term "Seller's retained property" is 
an insufficient description to satisfy the strict standard for 
describing property imposed by the statute of frauds. As the 
standard for sufficiency of the description depends, in part, 
on whether a right of first refusal is subject to the statute of 
frauds, the Court addresses this issue first. 
A. A Right of First Refusal is an Interest in Real 
Property and is Subject to the Statute of Frauds 
The Idaho appellate courts have not directly addressed the 
question of whether a right of first refusal is an interest in 
real property. However, the Idaho case law suggests that, if 
presented with that precise question, the Idaho courts would 
conclude that it is. One strong indicator of such a result is the 
manner in which the federal and state courts have dealt with 
options to purchase real property under Idaho law. 
Options are similar to a right of first refusal; indeed, rights 
of first refusal are a type of option. Both restrict whether a 
landowner can sell his land to someone other than the holder 
of the option or right of first refusal. Therefore, whether 
options are considered an interest in real property by Idaho 
courts is instructive to whether Idaho courts would consider 
a right of first refusal an interest in real property. 
*3 The Ninth Circuit, reviewing an older version ofldaho's 
statute of frauds, which was identical in all material respects 
to the current version, determined that oral agreements to 
create an option or extend an existing written option were 
invalid because options had to comply with the writing 
requirement of the statute of frauds. Lawyer v. Post et al., 109 
F. 512. 514 (9th Cir.l901 ). The Idaho Supreme Court, citing 
to Post, has more recently stated that options must comply 
with the statute of frauds. Southern v. Southern, 92 Idaho 180, 
438 P.2d 925, 926-27 (Idaho 1968). Because a right of first 
refusal is so similar in nature to an option, the Court concludes 
that a right of first refusal is an interest in real property subject 
to the statute of frauds. 1 
B. The Right of First Refusal Does Not Contain an 
Adequate Legal Description and the Plaintiff is therefore 
not entitled to Summary Judgment 
Turning then to the question of whether the right of first 
refusal in the parties' Addendum and Agreement complied 
with Idaho's statute of frauds, the Court notes that one of 
the requirements of the statute of frauds, other than that the 
agreement must be in writing, is that "the writing must also 
contain a description of the property, either in terms or by 
reference, so that the property can be identified without resort 
to parol evidence." Ray v. Frasure, 146 [daho 625,200 P.3d 
1174, 1177 (Idaho 2009). This standard is as strict as it 
appears. The Idaho courts have held that it is not satisfied by a 
lot and block number if a reference to the political subdivision 
is omitted,.-ll!en v. Kitchen, 16 Idaho 133, 100 P. 1052 (1909), 
by reference to a tax notice, Garner v. Bartschi, 139 Idaho 
430, 80 P.3d I 031, I 036 (Idaho 2003 ), by reference to a 
survey yet to be conducted of land excluded from the sale, 
White v. Rehn. l 03 Idaho I, 644 P.2d 323, 325 ( 1982), or by 
reference to a street address. Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 
200 P.3d 1174, 1177 (Idaho 2009). But see In re: ;v!iller v. 
Provident Bank, 260 B.R. 158 (Bankr.D.ldaho 200 I). 
Plaintiff contends that Idaho would not impose the same rigid 
requirement of a sufficient property description for limited 
interests in real property, such as a right of first refusal, as 
it does for outright sale of real property. However, Plaintiff 
overstates the holding of the cases upon which it relies. 
For example, Plaintiff cites an Idaho Supreme Court case 
for the proposition that a simple sketch of road on a plat 
is enough of a description. Monaco v. Bennion, 99 Idaho 
529, 585 P.2d 608 (Idaho 1978). However, in Monaco, the 
court did not address the issue of sufficiency of description. 
Rather, the focus of the decision was on an estoppel argument 
based on a claim that the defendant had made a dedication 
of the land in question which was analogous to a public 
road dedication. In that context, the sketch was discussed as 
providing further evidence of this analogy. Id. Wben read in 
context, the interpretation that Plaintiff gives to the case is 
unsupported by its language or reasoning. 
*4 Another example is Garmo v. Clanton, 97 ldaho 696, 551 
P.2d 1332 (Idaho 1976), in which the Idaho Supreme Court 
focuses on the sufficiency of a price description. The right of 
first refusal in that case described the subject property as "a 
narrow strip of land," and the court did indicate that a right 
of first refusal was created. However, there was no discussion 
about the adequacy of the description, and it appeared that 
the parties' only concern on appeal was whether the language 
discussing price was adequate. The case is therefore unhelpful 
to the decision in this case. 
The same conclusion can be drawn from the other Idaho 
cases cited by the plaintiff. They are taken out of context, or 
otherwise do not support the plaintiffs contention that a right 
of first refusal is subject to a different standard for a property 
description than the outright sale of real property. 
Plaintiff goes on to cite Missouri and Montana cases for 
the proposition that rights of first refusal should be treated 
differently from the outright sale of real property because 
the terms of a right of first refusal must be general since it 
is a right that will not come to fruition until a later date in 
the future. While this may be true of the price term, which 
the seller will not know until an offer is made, it is not true 
of the property description. The policy arguments in favor 
of the statute of frauds for an outright conveyance of real 
property apply with equal force to a right of first refusal. 
In both instances, the statute will avoid litigation, prevent 
clouds on the title of real property, and prevent unnecessary 
disputes as the precise boundaries of the property to be 
conveyed. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the standard 
for a sufficient property description reflected in decisions 
discussing the sale of property in Idaho should be applied to 
rights of first refusal. 2 
For a property description to be sufficient, the quantity, 
identity, or boundaries must be determinable from the face of 
the contract or by reference to extrinsic evidence to which the 
contract specifically refers. Lexington Heights Development, 
LLC v. Crandlemire. 140 Idaho 276, 92 P.3d 526,531 (Idaho 
2004 ). Paro! evidence may not be used to supply a description. 
Id. The statute of frauds may be satisfied by a legal description 
contained in a document extrinsic to the contract, but the 
contract must contain a clear and unambiguous reference to 
that extrinsic document. Ray v. Frasure, 146 Idaho 625, 200 
P.3d 1174, 1179 (Idaho 2009). 
The decisions of the Idaho Supreme Court indicate that this 
requirement is exacting. For example, in Ray v. Frasure, 
the seller and buyer used only the physical address of a 
residence to describe the real property to be sold and left 
the spot for a legal description blank. Id at 1175. The court 
held that a physical address alone was not a sufficient legal 
description. Significantly, the court declined to consider the 
legal description contained in the deed previously conveying 
the residence with the exact same physical address to the 
seller because the contract in question did not contain a 
specific reference the deed. Id. at 1179. Similarly, in a case 
where a description, in the form of a map with writing, was 
physically attached to an addendum that was referenced in 
the contract, but the addendum indicated it was only one 
page and did not itself reference the attached map, the Idaho 
Supreme Court could not conclude the map became part of the 
contract. Bauchman-Kingston Partnership LP v. Haroldsen, 
No. 34551, 2008 WL 5133788, at *4 (Idaho). Finally, and 
perhaps most significantly, the court's decision in Lexington 
Heights Development, LLC v. Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 
92 P.3d 526, 531 (Idaho 2004), makes clear that a reference 
to a survey to be performed after the execution of the contract 
is insufficient. In Lexington Heights, the parties entered into 
a written contract that stated the legal description would 
be prepared as a result of an "ALT A survey." Id After 
the ALT A survey was completed, the parties entered into a 
superceding contract which contained the same reference to 
a legal description which "will be" prepared as a result of an 
"ALT A survey" to be obtained by the seller. Id. The court 
Footnotes 
determined this was an insufficient legal description because 
the previous ALT A survey could not be used as it was already 
in existence and the contract referred to a survey that was to 
be done subsequent to the contract. Id at 532. 
*5 In this case, the parties' agreements do not contain a 
sufficient legal description. The property subject to the right 
of first refusal is only described as the "Seller's retained 
property," and no legal description is provided. While the 
parties' agreements provided for a survey of the conveyed 
property to be conducted after the contracts had been signed, 
there is no explicit provision as to how the conveyed property 
was to be distinguished from the retained property. As 
such, the agreements did not make a clear and unambiguous 
reference to an extrinsic document containing a precise legal 
description of the "Seller's retained property." Indeed, the 
survey was not in existence at the time the contracts were 
executed, and therefore could not provide the required legal 
description by reference. For these reasons, Plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment must be denied. 
CONCLUSION 
NOW THEREFORE IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Docket No. 
10) shall be, and the same is hereby, DENIED. 
All Citations 
Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2009 WL 1658022 
1 The Court also finds support from other jurisdictions for its conclusion that a right of first refusal is subject to the statute 
of fi'auds .. The Idaho statute of frauds requires that any conveyance, grant, or assignment of an interest in real property 
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